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ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to provide fresh evidence on the effect of the adoption of the euro on exports of different types of goods.
The novelty with respect to previous research is threefold. First, disaggregated trade data are used to allow for heterogeneous
effects for ﬁnal intermediate and capital goods. Second, we distinguish between the euro effect on the extensive and the inten-
sive margins of trade. Finally, we estimate the impact of the Euro adoption controlling for exchange rate volatility, exchange rate
movements and EU membership. This allows us to disentangle the effect of a common currency beyond the elimination of trade
barriers and of any variation in the exchange rate. The main results indicate that the impact of the Euro on trade values (intensive
margin) is around 9% for intermediates, 7% for ﬁnal goods and it is negative for capital goods. Interestingly, the Euro effects on
the extensive margin of trade are found to be negative and signiﬁcant for the three types of goods, pointing to increasing spe-
cialization. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The introduction of the Euro and the creation of the Euro zone in the late 1990s, associated with the abolition of
several European currencies, led to an avid debate among economists concerning the effect of the single-currency
adoption on trade. More recently, the global ﬁnancial crisis, the catalyst of the debt crises and the massive central
bank interventions in Europe and the U.S. increased exchange rate volatility again and brought the topic back on
the agenda.
In light of the recent events, especially the case of the European Union and the Euro adoption is worth a second
glance. The question whether joining a currency union boosts trade signiﬁcantly is very relevant for many Central
and Eastern European countries. The fact that countries like Poland have postponed their accession to the Euro is
linked to the idea that the expected positive trade effects on of joining a currency union might eventually turn into
negative economic effects.
The new trade theory that incorporates ﬁrm heterogeneity into the modelling framework and highlights the
importance of differences in productivity between ﬁrms in explaining trade gains (Melitz, 2003), identiﬁes two
channels through with a common currency could increase trade. First, through an increase in the average value
of the transactions, the so-called intensive margin of trade, this is mainly linked to a decrease in variable trade
costs. Second, through an increase in the number of varieties traded, namely the extensive margin of trade related
to a decrease in ﬁxed cost. Both transmission channels could be relevant to explain the Euro effect. However, it
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has to be mentioned that joining a currency union also imply that country members renounce to have an indepen-
dent monetary policy and hence are unable to implement competitive devaluations as a response to asymmetric
shocks.
The empirical literature on the relationship between currency unions and trade indicates that in general having a
common currency fosters trade. While early studies found large effects and trade to triple (Rose, 2000; Frankel and
Rose, 2002; Glick and Rose, 2002), most recent studies reported only moderate trade increases of around 5–30%
on average (Flam and Nordström, 2007; Baldwin and Di Nino, 2006; Eicher and Henn, 2011; Glick and Rose,
2002). It is also worth mentioned that a few authors reported instead non-signiﬁcant Euro effects on trade (e.g.
Berger and Nitsch, 2008; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2010).1 The usual argument supporting positive trade effects
from the formation of currency unions is that a currency union goes beyond the mere elimination of exchange rate
variability and lowers transaction costs to a greater extent.2 However, the effects might differ by type of product
traded, this issue been recently investigated by Badinger and Türkcan (2014).3 The authors ﬁnd that the Euro adop-
tion increase trade on average, but the main effect materializes through the intensive margin, while the Euro effect
on the extensive margin is found to be negative. The authors highlight the differences obtained for harmonized sys-
tem (HS) 2-digit products concerning the euro effect on trade. They base their explanation in the recent trade theory
models and their predictions concerning the link between the elasticity of substitution and reductions in trade costs.
Products with a high elasticity of substitution could be more affected by a reduction in trade costs than other prod-
ucts. We go a step forwards and group goods according to its ﬁnal use into capital, intermediate and ﬁnal goods;
and ask the question whether the effects differ for each type, because these three groups differ signiﬁcantly in terms
of contracting.
In this paper, we aim to provide further empirical evidence on the relationship between currency unions and
trade incorporating two main novelties with respect to previous research. First, disaggregated trade data at monthly
frequency are used to deal with differences among industries and between capital, ﬁnal and intermediate goods.
Second, we consider the presence of zero trade ﬂows and distinguish between extensive and intensive margins
of trade. In addition, the simultaneous incorporation into the model of exchange rate volatility, integration and cur-
rency effects allows us to disentangle the effect of a common currency beyond the elimination of any variation in
the exchange rate with other members and beyond the elimination of trade barriers. Furthermore, the developments
of the past years with the ﬁnancial crisis and the EU enlargement to the East are taken into account, yielding
additional ﬁndings and policy implications. Almost all empirical studies on the Euro effect are based on the gravity
model of trade,4 and this is also the chosen framework in this paper. We estimate an augmented gravity model of
trade for a sample of 35 countries over the period from January 1996 to December 2010.
We argue that previous studies investigating the Euro effect in the early years of the Eurozone could be biassed
because of the boom in imports from other Eurozone members to the periphery countries. This boom, as we know
today, was partly caused by consumption and housing bubbles that led to the European ‘debt crisis’. Hence, trade
effects for the early years, especially for ﬁnal goods, could have been overestimated.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical strategy and several issues
related to the econometric estimation. Section 3 presents the main results, and, ﬁnally, section 4 concludes with
a summary of the main ﬁndings and some policy implications.
2. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The empirical analysis is based on the standard gravity model of trade that was ﬁrst developed by Tinbergen
(1962). It is based on Newton’s law of universal gravitation, according to which planets are mutually attracted
in proportion to their physical mass and proximity. Transferred to the world of trade, physical mass is replaced with
economic mass which is usually measured as GDP. Thus, trade between two countries is modelled as a function of
their ‘economic mass’ and the distance between them and has the following form:
X ij ¼ GAiBjφij (1)
where Xij denotes the monetary value of exports from i to j, Ai and Bj denote exporter and importer speciﬁc factors
that inﬂuence production capacity in country i and demand in country j, respectively. G is a variable such as the
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level of world trade liberalization, which does not depend on country-speciﬁc factors. Finally, ϕij represents the
ease of exporter i to access to market j; it is the inverse of bilateral trade costs.
2.1. Estimation issues
Numerous contributions and further developments of the gravity model of trade have validated and enriched the
model in the past two decades. In particular, the work of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) has been very inﬂu-
ential. They emphasize that in a theoretically founded gravity model, trade costs must also enter in relative terms
with respect to the rest of the world in order to model a country overall ‘resistance’ to trade. A way to do this is by
introducing ‘multilateral trade-resistance’ (MTR) factors into the gravity framework. The basic idea is that two
countries tend to trade less with each other when they are surrounded by big economies than when they are
surrounded by water, mountains or deserts. We are specifying MTR using country-year dummies that control
for time-varying exporter and importer effects. Because GDP variables for exporter and importer, usually
employed in the gravity model to measure economic mass, vary only by year and country, we use the log of the
cross-product of GDPs.
Another important issue, especially when dealing with sectoral trade ﬂows or trade between small countries, is
the presence of zero trade ﬂows. While previous trade theories were not capable of explaining the existence of zeros
in trade ﬂows, the monopolistic-competition model of heterogeneous ﬁrms developed by Melitz (2003) explains
their existence with differences in productivity between ﬁrms. Helpman et al. (2008) speciﬁed a model that allows
controlling for zero trade ﬂows using a two-stage procedure that incorporates ﬁrm heterogeneity into the modelling
framework.
Alternative ways to retain the zero trade ﬂows have been proposed in the related literature. The most popular
one is to use the Pseudo Poisson maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation (Santos Silva and Tenreyo, 2006) the
implicit assumption of which is that that zeros are the result of rounding errors and hence missing observations
are wrongly recorded at zero (Martínez-Zarzoso, 2013). The PPML method estimates the gravity model in its orig-
inal multiplicative form, permitting the inclusion of zeros, and also allowing for a more ﬂexible distribution of the
error term. However, zeros can also be the result of ﬁrms’ decision not to export to a given destination, in particular
when dealing with sectoral trade data, as in this paper. In this case, Helpman et al. (2008) suggest taking a
Heckman approach, which involves two steps. In the ﬁrst stage, the probability of ﬁrms’ entering into an export
market (extensive margin), which is an unobserved variable in the standard gravity equation, is modelled using
a Probit model, and in the second, the gravity equation is estimated on the positive trade ﬂows including two
additional regressors: a correction for selection bias and a correction for ﬁrm heterogeneity. The main difﬁculty
in this approach is to ﬁnd an exclusion variable for the probit model (selection equation) that is exogenous to
the trade value. We solve this difﬁculty by using a corruption indicator (see below).
It is important to notice that although this method deals with zeros, its main aim is to remove the effect of the
extensive margin in order to isolate intensive margin effects (Head and Mayer, 2014).
The ﬁrst-stage Probit model is given by:
ρij ¼ Pr Tij ¼ 1
  ¼ Θ y0 þ νi þ σj þ κVCij þ ζFCij
 
(2)
where the probability of exports from i to j depends on importer and exporter dummies νi and σj, and ons bilateral
variable representing variable export costs, VCij, and ﬁxed costs of entry, FCij.
In the second stage, the determinants of trade ﬂows are estimated using an augmented version of the gravity
equation where two elements of the ﬁrst stage regression (the predicted value and the Inverse Mill’s Ratio,
IMR) are used to control for ﬁrm heterogeneity and sample selection bias. Following this approach, the resulting
equation then is:
X ij ¼ β0 þ I i þ I j þ κVCij þ ln eδ zijþηijÞ1ð Þþβηηijþeij

(3)
where Xij, the dependent variable, denotes trade ﬂows between i and j and Ii and Ij denote exporter- and importer-
speciﬁc factors. The term in brackets is the share of ﬁrms that export to j, with zij representing the predicted exten-
sive margin obtained from the ﬁrst stage and ηij the IMR.
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As mentioned above, requirement of this approach is to ﬁnd an exclusion restriction. A variable that enters the
ﬁrst stage and affects the probability to export but has no signiﬁcant impact on the trade value is needed to estimate
the model.
Most authors used a dummy variable that takes the value of one when countries share the same religion and zero
otherwise as the excluded variable (Helpman et al., 2008). In the European context, we do not consider this as a
good choice, as all countries share a Christian heritage and only some of their main trading partners differ in this
respect.5 In addition, the main religion of a speciﬁc country does usually not vary over time. Hence, in the case of
the EU members, we assume the cross product of the time varying measure of corruption for exporter and importer
could be an appropriate exclusion variable. The channel through which it affects trade is by rising insecurity and
associated extra ﬁxed costs for the exporting ﬁrm stemming from a higher probability of authorities or criminals
trying to extort bribes in their homeland or export destination (Crozet et al., 2008).
For ﬁrms in countries with very low levels of corruption, this can be seen as a serious obstacle to start exporting
as those countries are usually not used to this practices. Nevertheless, corruption could also have positive effects on
trade. For instance, corrupt ofﬁcials might allow ﬁrms to export or import even if their products do not meet tech-
nical, ethical, quality or safety standards. In overregulated countries, this could lower ﬁxed trade costs signiﬁcantly
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Either way, by inﬂuencing ﬁxed-costs rather than variable costs, corruption can be
thought of as an additional factor inﬂuencing the decision to trade, which is not expected to have a signiﬁcant
impact on the value of trade once ﬁrms learn how to operate in a corrupt environment.
An additional possible source of estimation bias is the endogeneity of the decision to join a currency union.
Frankel (2008) argues that endogeneity was not responsible for the extremely high estimates of early studies inves-
tigating currency union effects on trade. He presents estimates of similar magnitude to those found by a large num-
ber of early studies for the CFA zone, whose members have not decided to peg their currency to the Euro, but did
so after France joined the Euro zone. This peg was not accompanied by other steps of integration, which may have
boosted trade. It stands for an interesting natural experiment as the currency decision can be seen as exogenous.
In our case, we assume endogeneity of the currency decision is not a serious issue as past integration steps for
Euro zone members are controlled for with a dummy for membership in the European Union (EU). Besides the
common currency, Eurozone members have the same degree of trade facilitating integration as members of the
EU. We assume that the decision to join the Euro zone is a political decision that is mostly driven by other factors
different from those inﬂuencing the value of trade.6
2.2. DATA, SOURCES AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
The dataset consists on monthly bilateral exports for 35 countries over the period from January 1996 to December
2010. The countries included are the EU-27 countries and their mayor trading partners (Table A.1).7
The dependent variable is nominal monthly bilateral trade disaggregated according to the classiﬁcation by Broad
Economic Activities (BEC) from Eurostat.8 Because Eurostat does not contain data on bilateral trade between two
non-EU members, data on trade ﬂows between countries that are not members of the EU is not recorded. Never-
theless, the share of total EU-27 trade covered by our sample is well over 80% (Table A.1).
We assign the BEC sectors to three categories of goods, namely capital goods, intermediates and ﬁnal goods, as
recommended by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2007) (Table A.2). The share for
each BEC category in total trade for the whole sample is illustrated in Table A.2 and the evolution over time of total
trade for our three categories in shown in Figure 1.
Nominal GDP data are taken from the World Development Indicators database (WDI). To construct the bilateral
exchange rates9 and the volatility measure, we use daily nominal middle exchange rates reported by DataStream
from the WM Company/Reuters.10
Different measures of exchange rate volatility have been proposed in the related literature. Most approaches
have in common that they measure the variance, but differ in the implementation. Examples are the standard devi-
ation of the exchange rate or the moving standard deviation. Other measures, based on ARCH and GARCH
models, have gained popularity among researchers in recent years. In particular, a GARCH models the variance
of the disturbance term for each period as a function of the errors in the previous periods. All measures have
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drawbacks, like for instance the high persistence of real exchange rate shocks when moving average representa-
tions are applied, or low correlation in volatility when ARCH/GARCH models are used (Baum et al., 2004).
The related literature on the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade shows that use of more sophisticated
measures does not change the results (Corić and Pugh, 2010).
Another important question is whether the volatility of the nominal or the real exchange rate or both should be
included in the model. An advantage of the real exchange rate is that it captures the true relative price of the good;
however it also captures variation in the price levels, which is not desirable. Many studies use both exchange rates
and compare the results. The differences they ﬁnd are usually very small.11 Based on the recent literature, we have
selected the standard deviation of the ﬁrst difference of the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, which has been
used in various studies before (e.g. Clark et al., 2004):
Volatilityijt ¼ Std:dev: ln eijt;d
  ln eijt1;d
  
d ¼ 1…130 (4)
where e denotes the daily bilateral exchange rate between countries i and j at business day, d. This measure has the
advantage of being equal to zero when the exchange rate follows a consistent trend, which could be forecasted and
consequently would not be a source of uncertainty.
To avoid biases steeming from changes in price levels via spurious correlation, we use nominal exchange rates.
The measure is constructed as a short-term volatility measure with bilateral exchange rates from the past six
months. Departing from most previous studies, we construct the exchange rate volatility measure with daily
exchange rates, which allow for a more precise measure than ‘end of the month’ values, because exchange rates
sometimes tend to suffer more extreme movements at the end of each month. High persistence of exchange rate
shocks is not a problem, given that we only measure short-term volatility of the past six months with high fre-
quency data. In contrast to studies investigating long-run volatility, we investigate the effect of short-term exchange
rate volatility on trade by using a 6-month volatility measure. We assume that 6months have 130 business days and
thus construct the volatility measure accordingly.
Finally, corruption data are taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by the PRS
Group and are a component of the Political Risk Dataset. It has a scale from zero (extremely high level of corrup-
tion) to six and assesses corruption within the political system.12
3. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND MAIN RESULTS
Estimations are conducted for the abovementioned BEC categories of products: capital goods, intermediate goods
and consumption goods. These three groups differ signiﬁcantly in terms of contracting patterns and hence the var-
iables of interest might affect trade ﬂows in a different direction and to a different extent.
Figure 1. Monthly trade in capital, intermediate and ﬁnal goods over time. Source: Eurostat.
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3.1. Model speciﬁcation
First, we are estimating a gravity model of trade that incorporates the target integration and EU variables and
incorporates the usual control variables and year-varying country ﬁxed effects. The model is speciﬁed as,
lnX ijkt ¼ β0 þ β1 ln Y it*Y jt
 þ β2lnDistanceij þ β3EUijt þ β4Euroijt
þβ5Borderij þ β6Languageij þ β7Landlockedij þ β8Islandij
þβ9Colonyij þ β10Volatilityijt þ β11lnExRateijt
þβ12Corruptionijt þ κκ þ λm þ αiy þ γjy þ εijkt;
(5)
εijkm ¼ μijk þ ϵijkt
where the explained variable Xijkt denotes nominal exports in sector k from the reporter country i to the partner
country j at time t (monthm in year t). Yit and Yjt denote GDP of country i and j, in year t. Border, Language, Island
and Colony are dummy variables that take the value of one when countries share a border, have a common ofﬁcial
language, are islands or have ever had a colonial relationship. Landlocked is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if country i does not have an exit to the sea, 2 if countries i and j are both landlocked and zero otherwise. The
coefﬁcients for these time-invariant variables cannot be directly obtained when the model is estimated adding
bilateral-sectoral time-invariant (dyadic-sectoral: κijk) ﬁxed effects (not speciﬁed in equation (5)), which is the pre-
ferred speciﬁcation.
Volatility denotes exchange rate volatility and is calculated using equation (4) and ExRate is the bilateral nom-
inal exchange rate. Corruption is a discrete variable taking values in the range 0–6, with higher values indicating
less corruption. The independent variable κk controls for industry differences with dummy variables for each
BEC category and λm controls for monthly seasonal effects with dummy variables for each month, m. The year-
varying ﬁxed effects αit and νjt are proxies for multilateral resistance factors.
The simultaneous inclusion of the measure of nominal exchange rate volatility and the dummy variable for
mutual Euro membership allows us to capture convex effects as described by Baldwin (2006). The variables are
described in Table A.3.
Next, in order take into account the existence of zero trade ﬂows we are following the two-stage approach pro-
posed by Helpman et al. (2008). The ﬁrst step estimation is a probit regression on the probability to export:
Pr X ijkt ¼ 1
  ¼ Θ½β0 þ β1 ln Y it*Y jt
 þ β2lnDistanceij þ β3EUijt þ β4Euroijt þ β5Borderij
þβ6Languageij þ β7Landlockedij þ β8Islandij þ β9Colonyij þ β10Volatilityijt
þβ11lnExRateijt þ β12Corruptionijt þ κκ þ λm þ αi þ γj:
(6)
The second step is estimated as a FE (with country-pair-sector ﬁxed effects) regression including the linear
prediction of exports down-weighted by its standard error (ZHAT) and the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). To fulﬁl
the exclusion restriction, the variable corruption is excluded from the model. The speciﬁcation is given by,
lnX ijkt ¼ β0 þ β1 ln Y it*Y jt
 þ β2lnDistanceij þ β3EUijt þ β4Euroijt þ β5Borderij
þ β6Languageij þ β7Landlockedij þ β8Islandij þ β9Colonyij
þ β10Volatilityijt þ β11lnExRateijt
þ β12ZHAT þ β13IMRþ κκ þ λm þ αit þ γjt þ εijkt
(7)
εijkm ¼ μijk þ ϵijkt
where the included variables have been described below equation (5).
Equation (7) is estimated ﬁrst with the typical time-invariant gravity controls (distance, common border, com-
mon language and so on) and second, with bilateral-sector ﬁxed effects (κijk instead of κk) and excluding the
dyadic-time-invariant variables. In the latter case, coefﬁcients for the time-invariant controls cannot be directly
estimated, because their effect is subsumed in the ﬁxed effects (μijk) and also sectoral ﬁxed effect cannot be added
as controls.
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3.2. Main results
The extended gravity model is estimated for a sample of 35 countries over 15 years. Table 1 present the results
obtained from estimating model (5) with dyadic-sectoral FE for capital goods, intermediates and ﬁnal goods
separately.13
The Euro effect on exports is negative for capital goods with estimates around0.11 and positive for
intermediates and ﬁnal goods, with estimates around 0.09 and 0.06, respectively. In percentages, the Euro
increase exports around 11% for intermediates and 9% for ﬁnal goods. When excluding exchange rate
volatility and exchange rate movements, the impact of the Euro on exports rises slightly (Columns 4–6,
Table 1). The estimated coefﬁcient for EU membership, which should give an idea of the effect of EU
membership on the intensive margin, equals 0.11 for capital goods (Table 1, column 1), 0.09 for intermedi-
ate goods (Table 1, column 2), and 0.2 for ﬁnal goods (Table 1, column 3). Hence, the highest EU effect is
found for ﬁnal goods.
Robust negative effects of the volatility measure on trade for the current period and for all the lags considered14
are observed. While for ﬁnal goods (Table 1, column 3), the effect is higher for the current value of the volatility
variable than for the past values, for capital goods (Table 1, column 1) lags of the volatility variable present higher
coefﬁcients than the current value. Finally, for intermediates (Table 1, column 2), the current value and the ﬁrst lag
show higher elasticities than the second and third lags.
Results in Table 2 are obtained using the Helpman et al. (2008) modelling strategy.
Columns 1, 3 and 5 show the ﬁrst step results obtained from estimating equation (6). The results indicate
that the probability to trade is negatively affected by the Euro adoption, with estimated coefﬁcients that are
slightly higher for capital goods (0.33) than for intermediates (0.26) and ﬁnal goods (0.24). The results
for the second step estimation are shown in columns 2, 4 and 6. The Euro effect is positive and signiﬁcant
for intermediate and ﬁnal goods and slightly higher for the former, and negative for capital goods, similar to
Table 1.
The results also show that mutual EU membership has a signiﬁcant positive effect on the probability to trade as
well as on the trade value for all types of goods. The coefﬁcient of the EU dummy in the probit model is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant and range from 0.26 for capital goods and 0.34 for intermediates to 0.44 for ﬁnal goods.
Table 1. Regression results for the baseline model (panel estimation)
Capital goods Intermediates Final goods
Euro 0.114*** (0.0207) 0.0942*** (0.0116) 0.0648*** (0.00999)
EU 0.115*** (0.0161) 0.0896*** (0.00902) 0.202*** (0.0079)
ln GDPs 0.447***(0.0395) 0.682*** (0.0179) 0.416*** (0.0152)
Volatility 2.805*** (0.514) 2.435*** (0.285) 2.426*** (0.234)
L1.Volatility 3.482*** (0.612) 2.560*** (0.339) 2.186*** (0.282)
L2.Volatility 3.527*** (0.509) 1.865*** (0.282) 1.438*** (0.235)
L3.Volatility 1.451*** (0.531) 0.617** (0.298) 0.968*** (0.247)
ln ExRate 0.301*** (0.071) 0.0911** (0.0394) 0.276*** (0.0347)
ln L1.ExRate 0.05 (0.0634) 0.0820** (0.0349) 0.0592* (0.0311)
ln L2.ExRate 0.271*** (0.0734) 0.0136 (0.0409) 0.0667* (0.036)
ln L3.ExRate 0.0826 (0.0547) 0.0191 (0.0301) 0.0589** (0.0268)
Corruption 0.0089*** (0.00308) 0.00117 (0.00169) 0.0003 (0.00149)
Obs. 283 895 1 045 992 879 509
R2 0.194 0.113 0.167
RMSE 1.171 1.243 1.006
Note: HAC robust standard errors are in brackets. Signiﬁcance levels:
*10%,
**5% and
***1%; Reported R2 is within R2.
All models include dyadic-sectoral, monthly and origin-year, destination-year FE. L1–L3 denote the ﬁrst, second and third lagged value of the
corresponding variable.
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Thus, mutual EU membership increases the extensive margin of trade signiﬁcantly, especially for industries pro-
ducing ﬁnal goods (Table 2, column 5). Also, the effect on the intensive margin stays positive and signiﬁcant in
the second step estimation with coefﬁcients being slightly higher for capital and intermediate goods in comparison
to the corresponding estimated in Table 1, where selection effects and ﬁrm heterogeneity where not considered.
Meanwhile, the effect for ﬁnal goods remains the same as in Table 1.
The excluded variable in the second stage, bilateral-corruption, which is expected to have an impact only on the
probability to trade, but not on the value, performs considerably well. The measure has an insigniﬁcant impact on
trade values (Table 1) and a signiﬁcant impact on the probability to trade. Only for capital goods, the impact on the
value traded is statistically signiﬁcant, but very low.
In order to compare the magnitude of the effects of the exchange rate variables and the euro and EU effects beta
coefﬁcients have been computed (Table A.4 in the Appendix). The results indicate that the reduction of exchange
rate volatility has a slightly stronger effect on trade in intermediate goods than the euro adoption, which implies
complete elimination of this volatility, however the importance is reversed for ﬁnal goods, for which the euro adop-
tion has a clear stronger effect (almost twofold) than the reduction of exchange rate volatility. The same is the case
for capital goods but to a lower extent.
Table 3. Robustness checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample 1999–2010 Without big four
Category of
goods#: 1 2 3 1 2
Euro 0.0761*** (0.0244) 0.134*** (0.014) 0.107*** (0.012) 0.103*** (0.0211) 0.116*** (0.0127)
EU 0.130*** (0.0162) 0.0958*** (0.00902) 0.204*** (0.00797) 0.0564*** (0.0165) 0.078*** (0.0098)
ln GDPs 0.474*** (0.0134) 0.529*** (0.0109) 0.477***(0.00954) 0.448*** (0.0112) 0.489*** (0.0096)
ln Distance 1.201*** (0.0554) 1.549*** (0.0499) 1.265*** (0.0437) 1.266*** (0.0482) 1.575*** (0.0473)
Border 0.601*** (0.0998) 1.153*** (0.0897) 0.860*** (0.079) 0.539*** (0.0885) 1.255*** (0.0869)
Language 0.193* (0.115) 0.103 (0.104) 0.152* (0.0906) 0.304*** (0.105) 0.00207 (0.104)
Colony 0.548*** (0.121) 0.290*** (0.109) 0.338***(0.0959) 0.172 (0.122) 0.247** (0.12)
Island 0.815*** (0.199) 0.578*** (0.172) 0.156 (0.152) 0.149 (0.186) 0.104 (0.167)
Landlocked 1.510*** (0.264) 2.275*** (0.193) 1.116*** (0.169) 1.247*** (0.247) 1.575*** (0.191)
Volatility 0.0637 (0.764) 1.349***(0.424) 1.162*** (0.341) 0.236 (0.769) 1.024** (0.455)
L1.Volatility 0.699 (0.985) 1.202** (0.55) 0.00509 (0.443) 0.51 (0.999) 1.176** (0.596)
L2.Volatility 2.008** (1.007) 0.0105 (0.56) 1.635***(0.454) 1.626 (1.04) 0.682 (0.616)
L3.Volatility 0.547 (0.753) 0.153 (0.415) 0.225 (0.339) 0.48 (0.795) 0.970** (0.464)
ln ExRate 0.878 (0.582) 0.408 (0.323) 0.195 (0.286) 0.363 (0.655) 0.524 (0.386)
ln L1.ExRate 3.464*** (1.255) 0.645 (0.694) 0.183 (0.616) 2.301 (1.445) 0.699 (0.851)
ln L2.ExRate 3.299*** (1.179) 0.00908 (0.65) 0.838 (0.579) 1.647 (1.434) 0.133 (0.846)
ln L3.ExRate 0.831* (0.499) 0.256 (0.274) 0.802*** (0.245) 0.376 (0.64) 0.0121 (0.378)
Corruption 0.0083** (0.00332) 0.00143 (0.00184) 0.00143 (0.00164) 0.0028 (0.00345) 0.007*** (0.0020)
Year> 1998 Yes Yes Yes — —
USA Yes Yes Yes — —
Russia Yes Yes Yes — —
Japan Yes Yes Yes — —
China Yes Yes Yes — —
Turkey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 258 383 950 750 800 811 226 992 837 354
R2 0.694 0.619 0.68 0.719 0.649
RMSE 1.186 1.254 1.026 1.112 1.249
Note: Category 1 denotes capital goods, 2 intermediates and 3 consumption goods. HAC robust standard errors are in brackets. Signiﬁcance
levels:
*10%,
**5% and
***1%; Reported R2 is the overall R2.
Model (1) estimation with random effects. L1–L3 denote the ﬁrst, second and third lagged value of the corresponding variable.
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All coefﬁcients of the other variables included in the gravity equation show the expected signs. Estimates are
always signiﬁcant and positive for the GDP cross product and negative and signiﬁcant for the distance between
capitals (shown in Table 3, RE estimates).
Controls for common border always show signiﬁcant positive estimates and the coefﬁcient of the variable
island is negative and signiﬁcant. While the control variable for common ofﬁcial language shows mixed results,
former colonial ties have a negative impact on the probability to export, but a positive on the value exported
(Table 3).
A number of robustness indicates that the results are stable. We ﬁnd that reducing the time period (Table 3,
columns 1 to 3), or excluding economically big non-European countries (Table 3, columns 4 to 6) from the
sample does not affect the results for the EU or Euro dummies. For the robustness we have chosen to present
the random effects results, given that the coefﬁcients of interest remain almost the same and in order to show
as well the inﬂuence of the typical gravity variables, namely distance, common border, common language and
colonial relationship. Nevertheless, the volatility variables lose signiﬁcance and their general impact is less
clear-cut. This is probably because of the fact that exchange rates in the full sample are more volatility before
1999 for countries that later joined the Euro and, in general, between EU-27 and countries with more or less
free ﬂoating exchange rates like U.S., Russia or India. We also tried to estimate the model using Poisson
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood suggested in the gravity literature (Santos Silva and Tenreyo, 2006; Head and
Mayer, 2014) to accommodate zero trade ﬂows. However, convergence could not be achieved in most cases
when using the MRT, dyadic-sectoral and monthly dummy variables. Additionally, when convergence was
achieved, the estimates were not stable to small changes in the speciﬁcation. A similar problem was reported
in Badinger and Türkcan (2014).
Table 3. Robustness checks
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Without big four Adding countries to sample (capital goods)
Category of
goods#: 3 1 1 1 1
Euro 0.068*** (0.0108) 0.104*** (0.0211) 0.103*** (0.0209) 0.105*** (0.0206) 0.0841*** (0.0208)
EU 0.136*** (0.0085) 0.089*** (0.0165) 0.119*** (0.0163) 0.127*** (0.0161) 0.129*** (0.0163)
ln GDPs 0.390*** (0.0084) 0.477*** (0.0121) 0.461*** (0.0119) 0.460*** (0.0119) 0.459*** (0.0129)
ln Distance 1.315*** (0.0415) 1.246*** (0.0488) 1.222*** (0.0498) 1.217*** (0.0502) 1.297*** (0.0524)
Border 0.816*** (0.0766) 0.501*** (0.0896) 0.581*** (0.0888) 0.603*** (0.09) 0.492*** (0.0946)
Language 0.179** (0.0908) 0.298*** (0.101) 0.249** (0.102) 0.213** (0.104) 0.322*** (0.108)
Colony 0.143 (0.106) 0.363*** (0.113) 0.543*** (0.108) 0.533*** (0.109) 0.819*** (0.117)
Island 1.210*** (0.147) 0.912*** (0.184) 1.034*** (0.185) 1.027*** (0.186) 1.293*** (0.193)
Landlocked 0.872*** (0.166) 2.123*** (0.248) 1.721*** (0.237) 1.655*** (0.235) 1.358*** (0.263)
Volatility 0.968*** (0.355) 0.25 (0.776) 0.452 (0.738) 0.329 (0.731) 0.154 (0.748)
L1.Volatility 0.277 (0.465) 0.561 (1.008) 1.59 (0.97) 1.709* (0.959) 1.744* (0.987)
L2.Volatility 1.761*** (0.482) 1.814* (1.049) 1.427 (0.996) 1.373 (0.983) 1.564 (1.016)
L3.Volatility 0.436 (0.365) 0.518 (0.801) 0.807 (0.746) 0.55 (0.737) 0.555 (0.76)
ln ExRate 0.0683 (0.336) 0.93 (0.633) 0.279 (0.49) 0.155 (0.471) 0.0256 (0.508)
ln L1.ExRate 0.325 (0.739) 2.837*** (1.399) 1.863*(1.08) 1.632 (1.041) 1.437 (1.116)
ln L2.ExRate 0.535 (0.735) 1.439 (1.392) 1.226 (1.058) 1.3 (1.022) 1.531 (1.096)
ln L3.ExRate 0.448 (0.329) 0.549 (0.621) 0.249 (0.466) 0.0475 (0.45) 0.386 (0.485)
Corruption 0.012*** (0.0018) 0.0023 (0.0035) 0.00394 (0.0033) 0.0058* (0.0032) 0.0112*** (0.00311)
Year> 1998 — — — — —
USA — Yes Yes Yes Yes
Russia — — Yes Yes Yes
Japan — — — Yes Yes
China — — — — Yes
Turkey Yes Yes Yes Yes —
Obs. 702 413 242 764 256 432 270 343 270 092
R2 0.704 0.715 0.709 0.705 0.708
RMSE 0.999 1.148 1.162 1.166 1.183
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The main ﬁndings in this paper indicate that while mutual EU membership promotes trade through the extensive
and intensive margin for most goods, Euro membership does so only via the intensive margin and not for capital
goods. This could provide some evidence for a pronounced specialization-process taking place in the Euro zone at
the industry level after the introduction of the Euro, which results in countries exporting goods from a lower num-
ber of industries, but with a higher value added. According to our results, the effect is slightly stronger for inter-
mediate than for ﬁnal goods. However, further research is needed to conﬁrm this statement ideally using trade in
value added.
The results for the extensive margin are in contrast to ﬁndings obtained by other authors (Bergin and Lin, 2012;
Baldwin and Di Nino, 2006), who mostly found positive Euro effects on the extensive margin, but in line with
Badinger and Türkcan (2014). In our study, this could be because of the product disaggregation and the monthly
frequency of the trade data used. Negative effects on a monthly level do not necessarily mean that while the Euro
forced a strong specialization process with pronounced seasonality on the industry level, the number of different
products traded between members of the Euro zone on a yearly basis could have increased.
The introduction of controls for ﬁrm heterogeneity and sample selection bias does not change the results
substantially. Nonetheless, extensive and intensive margin are affected very differently by our variables of interest.
When dropping observations with higher volatility from the sample, the impact of exchange volatility on trade is
less clear, while the impact of mutual EU and Euro membership remains robust.
Policy implications stemming from our results aremanifold. Policymakers should keep inmind, that currency unions
come at great costs with regard to the ﬂexibility of the domestic monetary policy and positive trade effects may be very
limited and do not exist for all types of goods. A ﬁxed peg can also achieve the elimination of exchange rate volatility.
Although we ﬁnd a relatively small trade effect accruing from eliminating exchange rate variations, it still may be the
best choice to avoid negative impacts as experienced currently in Euro zone and grants greater ﬂexibility.
The question whether stabilizing the exchange rate is a desirable objective for policymakers is unclear and it is
also unclear to which extent the real exchange rate is a variable that policymakers should be able to inﬂuence or
actually can inﬂuence, besides establishing a currency union, a ﬁxed peg or Dollarization (Eichengreen, 2007;
Rodrik, 2008).
In light of the recent economic and current political crisis in Europe, our results provide evidence that a common
currency may reduce investments and thus trade in capital goods within the currency union. Together with other
imbalances, like current account imbalances or real exchange rate misalignments, this may lead to a loss in com-
petitiveness that cannot be compensated by a devaluation of the domestic currency by a single member.
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ENDNOTES
1. Non signiﬁcant Euro effects have been found when estimating the gravity model using pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood (PPML) tech-
niques without dyadic ﬁxed effects, also in Glick and Rose (2015).
2. Baldwin (2006) provides a good overview on the early literature.
3. Other unpublished studies using product-level trade are Di Nino (2009) and Flam and Nordström, 2007.
4. An exception is Saia (2014) who uses a synthetic control approach to evaluate the cost of the United Kingdom of staying outside the
Eurozone.
5. Namely China, India and Turkey.
6. We use of panel data techniques with country-pair-sector ﬁxed effects to controls for time-invariant sources of endogeneity.
7. Data for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia is
missing for the years from 1996 to 1998.
8. A thorough description of the BEC classiﬁcation is available from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2007).
9. The bilateral exchange rate measure is the average exchange rate of the past six months.
10. This rate is the midpoint between the bid rate and the offered rate.
11. A comprehensive comparison of the effects of real and nominal exchange rate volatility on exports was conducted by Cotter & Bredin
(2006) ﬁnding that magnitude and direction are not changing, while timing effects can be different.
12. In our dataset the cross-product for both countries ranges from 2 to 36.
EURO EFFECTS ON TRADE IN FINAL, INTERMEDIATE AND CAPITAL GOODS 11
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/ijfe
13. The results for the corresponding random effects model were very similar for the Euro effect: 0.10 for capital goods, 0.089 for interme-
diates and 0.068 for ﬁnal goods. We report the FE because the Hausman test indicates that the error term is not orthogonal to the regressors
in the RE model.
14. Exchange rate volatility and exchange rate movements are modelled using the current value and the ﬁrst three lags to incorporate dynamic
effects.
APPENDIX
Table A.1. List of countries and share in total trade
Eurozone Other EU-Members Non-EU Members
Country-Year (€) Trade share% Country Trade share% Country Trade share%
Austria (1999) 87.07 Bulgaria 78.41 Switzerland 69.75
Belgium (1999) 91.62 Czech Republic 93.51 China 15.80
Cyprus (2008) 61.66 Denmark 83.75 India 19.60
Germany (1999) 80.58 Estonia (2011) 91.73 Japan 13.36
Spain (1999) 82.00 United Kingdom 82.91 Norway 72.39
Finland (1999) 85.16 Hungary 88.48 Russia 32.52
France (1999) 84.09 Lithuania 88.77 Turkey 49.57
Greece (2001) 71.01 Latvia 90.86 USA 19.04
Ireland (1999) 90.62 Poland 88.74
Italy (1999) 80.78 Romania 85.09
Luxemburg (1999) 96.18 Sweden 87.93
Malta (2008) 64.49
Netherlands (1999) 88.28
Portugal (1999) 86.63
Slovakia (2009) 93.69
Slovenia (2007) 72.39
Note: Figures are average shares of total trade value covered by our sample over 16 BEC categories and 15 years. Years in the ﬁrst column
indicate the year in which the euro was adopted.
Table A.2. List of products and corresponding BEC category
BEC code Description Category % of total trade
111 Food and beverages/primary/mainly for industry 2 0.57
112 Food and beverages/primary/mainly for household consumption 3 1.55
121 Food and beverages/processed/mainly for industry 2 0.45
122 Food and beverages/processed/mainly for household consumption 3 4.54
210 Industrial supplies n.e.s./primary 2 2.07
220 Industrial supplies n.e.s./processed 2 27.00
310 Fuels and lubricants/primary 2 3.61
321 Fuels and lubricants/processed/motor spirit — 0.45
322 Fuels and lubricants/processed/other 2 2.63
410 Capital goods (except transport equipment) 1 14.32
420 Capital goods/parts and accessories 2 9.21
510 Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof/passenger motor cars — 6.68
521 Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof/other/industrial 1 3.66
522 Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof/other/non-industrial 3 0.43
530 Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof/parts and accessor. 2 7.39
610 Consumer goods n.e.s./durable 3 3.32
620 Consumer goods n.e.s./semi-durable 3 4.93
630 Consumer goods n.e.s./non-durable 3 6.67
700 Goods not elsewhere speciﬁed — 0.51
Note: the percents are average ﬁgures for the whole period. Category 1 denotes capital goods, 2 intermediates and 3 consumption goods.
INMACULADA MARTÍNEZ-ZARZOSO AND FLORIAN JOHANNSEN12
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/ijfe
REFERENCES
Anderson JE, Van Wincoop E. 2003. Gravity with gravitas: a solution to the border puzzle. American Economic Review 93(1):
170–192.
Badinger H, Türkcan K. 2014. Currency unions, export margins and product differentiation: an empirical assessment for
European monetary union. Review of International Economics 22(1): 13–30.
Baldwin R. 2006. The Euro’s trade effect. ECB Working Paper Series, 594.
Baldwin R, Di Nino V. 2006. Euros and zeros: the common currency effect on trade in New goods. NBER Working Paper
Series, 12673.
Baum CF, Caglayan M, Ozkan N. 2004. Nonlinear effects of exchange rate volatility on the volume of bilateral exports. Journal
of Applied Econometrics 19(1): 1–23.
Berger H, Nitsch V. 2008. Zooming out: the trade effect of the euro in historical perspective. Journal of International Money
and Finance 27(8): 1244–1260.
Table A.4. Beta coefﬁcients
Capital goods Intermediates Final goods
FE Second step FE FE Second step FE FE Second step FE
Euro 0.013 0.008 0.01 0.008 0.008 0.009
EU 0.019 0.02 0.013 0.013 0.034 0.034
ln GDPs 0.364 0.198 0.492 0.476 0.346 0.195
Volatility 0.028 0.014 0.015 0.019 0.019 0.016
ln ExRate 0.107 0.106 0.004 0.002 0.343 0.345
Corruption 0.021 0.002 0.001
Zhat 0.028 0.007 0.007
IMR 0.005 0.012 0.009
Note: Beta coefﬁcients are calculated by standardizing the estimates from the regression analysis (Tables 1 and 2), so that the variances of both
dependent and independent variables are one. They refer to how many standard deviations the explained variable will change per standard
deviation increase in the corresponding explanatory variable.
Table A.3. Variable description and sources
Variable Description Source
ln X Log of monthly exports of good k from country i to j at month m of year t
in US$
Eurostat
ln GDPs = ln
(Yit ×Yjt)
Log of the cross-product of nominal GDP (Y) of the countries i and j at
year t in US$
CEPII
ln Distance Log of distance between capitals of country i and j in km CEPII
EU Dummy whether (1) or not (0) the countries i and j are both members of
the EU at time t
CIA World Factbook 2011
Euro Dummy whether (1) or not (0) the countries i and j have the Euro as a
common currency and time t
CIA World Factbook 2011
Border Dummy whether (1) or not (0) the countries i and j share a common
border
CEPII
Language Dummy whether (1) or not (0) the countries i and j share a common
ofﬁcial language
CEPII
Landlocked Dummy whether none (0), one of the countries i and j (1), or both (2) are
landlocked
CIA World Factbook 2011
Island Dummy whether none (0), one of the countries i and j (1), or both (2) are
on an island
CIA World Factbook 2011
Colony Dummy whether (1) or not (0) the countries i and j ever had a colonial link CEPII
Volatility Bilateral volatility measure of the nominal exchange rate of the countries i
and j at month m of year t
WM Company/Reuters
ln ExRate Log of the bilateral nominal exchange rate of the countries i and j at a
given month m of year t
WM Company/Reuters
Corruption Cross-product of the corruption measure of countries i and j at year t International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG)
EURO EFFECTS ON TRADE IN FINAL, INTERMEDIATE AND CAPITAL GOODS 13
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/ijfe
Bergin PR, Lin C-Y. 2012. The dynamic effects of currency union on trade. Journal of International Economics 87: 191–204.
Clark PB, Tamirisa N, Wei SJ. 2004. Exchange rate volatility and trade ﬂows—some new evidence. International Monetary
Fund Occasional Paper, No. 235.
Crozet M, Koenig P, Rebeyrol V. 2008. Exporting to insecure markets: a ﬁrm-level analysis. CEPII WP N 2008-13.
Corić B, Pugh G. 2010. The effects of exchange rate variability on international trade: a meta-regression analysis. Applied
Economics 42(20): 2631–2644.
Eichengreen B. 2007. The real exchange rate and economic growth. Commission on Growth and Development Working Paper,
4. World Bank.
Eicher TS, Henn C. 2011. One money, one market: a revised benchmark. Review of International Economics 19(3): 419–435.
Flam H, Nordström H. 2007. Explaining large euro effects on trade: the extensive margin and vertical specialization. Manu-
script, Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University.
Frankel J. 2008. The estimated effects of the euro on trade: why are they below historical effects of monetary unions among
smaller countries? NBER Working Papers, 14542.
Frankel J, Rose AK. 2002. An estimate of the effect of common currencies on trade and income. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 117(2): 437–466.
Glick R, Rose AK. 2002. Does a currency union affect trade? The time-series evidence. European Economic Review 46(6):
1125–51.
Head, K., T. Mayer, 2014. Gravity equations: workhorse, toolkit, and cookbook. In G. Gopinath, E. Helpman, K. Rogoff (eds.)
Handbook of international economics, 4, Amsterdam: Elsevier-North Holland.
Helpman E, Melitz M, Rubinstein Y. 2008. Estimating trade ﬂows: trading partners and trading volumes. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 123(2): 441–487.
Martínez-Zarzoso I. 2013. The log of gravity revisited. Applied Economics 45(3): 311–327.
Melitz MJ. 2003. The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry productivity. Econometrica 71(6):
1695–1725.
Rodrik D. 2008. The real exchange rate and economic growth. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2008, 365-439.
Rose AK. 2000. One money, one market: estimating the effect of common currencies on trade. Economic Policy 15(30): 7–46.
Rose-Ackerman S. 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform, Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge. United Kingdom.
Santos Silva JMC, Tenreyro S. 2010. Currency unions in prospect and retrospect. Annual Review of Economics 2(1): 51–74.
Saia A. 2014. Choosing the Open Sea: The Cost to the UK of Staying Out of the Euro, University of Bologna: Mimeo.
Santos Silva JMC, Tenreyo S. 2006. The log of gravity. Review of Economics and Statistics 88: 641–658.
Tinbergen J. 1962. Shaping the World Economy; Suggestions for an International Economic Policy, Twentieth Century Fund:
New York.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2007. Future revision of the Classiﬁcation by Broad Economic
Categories (BEC).
INMACULADA MARTÍNEZ-ZARZOSO AND FLORIAN JOHANNSEN14
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. (2016)
DOI: 10.1002/ijfe
